Abstract. SIMD is one of the round 2 candidates of the public SHA-3 competition hosted by NIST. It was designed by Leurent et al.. In this paper, we present a distinguisher attack on the compression function of SIMD-512. By linearizing the compression function we construct a linear code. Using techniques from coding theory to search for low Hamming weight codewords, we can find differential characteristics with low Hamming weight (and hence high probability). In the attack the differences are introduced only in the IV . Such a characteristic is the base for our distinguisher, which can distinguish the compression function of SIMD-512 from random with a complexity of 5 · 2 425.28 compression function calls. Furthermore, we can distinguish the output transformation of SIMD-512 from random with a complexity of about 22 · 2 425.28 compression function calls. So far this is the first cryptanalytic result for the SIMD hash function.
Introduction
Recently, the NIST hash function competition [12] has started. In this public competition to find an alternative hash function to replace the SHA-1 and SHA-2 hash functions, many new designs have been proposed. In November 2008, round one has started and in total 51 out of 64 submissions have been accepted. Recently, the 14 round 2 candidates were announced. SIMD, designed by Leurent et al. [8] , is one of them. It is an iterative hash function based on the MerkleDamgård design principle [5, 11] . It is a wide-pipe design [9] producing a hash value up to 512 bits, denoted by SIMD-n, where n is the output length. For the remainder of this paper wherever we mention SIMD we refer to SIMD-512. The design of the compression function is similar to the MD4 family. Furthermore, there exist several proofs [4, 10] for the mode of operation used by SIMD. The designers additionally provide bounds for a large class of differential attacks. Most of the security is based on the message expansion. In this paper, we present a distinguisher attack on the compression function of SIMD-512 with a complexity of 5 · 2 425.28 compression function calls. Including the output transformation we can distinguish the output of SIMD-512 from random with a complexity of about 22 · 2 425.28 compression function calls. The distinguisher is based on a differential characteristic with differences only in the IV . A characteristic with high success probability is found by using techniques from coding theory. By linearizing the compression function we define a linear code where each codeword represents a differential characteristic. Using an algorithm to find low Hamming weight codewords, we found characteristics which lead to the above attack complexity.
Even if we do not attack the whole hash function, we show unexpected nonrandom properties of the SIMD-512 compression function. However, our attack does not invalidate the security claims of the designers, since most of the security comes from the message expansion, but note that the non-randomness of the compression function of SIMD effects the applicability of the proofs for the mode of operation build upon it.
The structure of this paper is as follows. A short description of SIMD is given in Section 2. Section 3 gives an overview of the basic attack strategy. Section 4 shows in which way we linearized the compression function of SIMD. Followed by Section 5 containing the description of the techniques from coding theory to find good characteristics. Finally, the distinguisher for full SIMD is presented in Section 6.
Description of SIMD
SIMD is an iterative hash function that follows the Merkle-Damgård design. The main component of a Merkle-Damgård hash function is the compression function. In the case of SIMD-512 to compute the hash of a message M , it is first divided into k chunks of 1024 bits. By the use of a message expansion one block is expanded to 8192 bits. Then the compression function is used to compress the message chunks and the internal state. The padding rule to fill the last blocks is known as the Merkle-Damgård strengthening. The initial value of the internal state is called IV and is fixed in the specification of the hash function. The output of the hash function is given by computing a finalization function on the last internal state, which is a truncation for SIMD. The internal state of SIMD contains 32 32-bit words and is therefore twice as large as the output. SIMD consist of 4 rounds where each round consist of 8 steps. The feedforward consists of four additional steps with the IV as message input. Since we apply a compression function attack independent from the message expansion, we omit the description of the message expansion. For a detailed description of the hash function we refer to [8] .
SIMD Step Function
The core part of SIMD is the step function of the state update. Figure 1 illustrates the step function at step t. The state update consists of eight step functions in parallel. To make the step function dependent from each other, (A t−1 p t (i) ≪ r t ) is included in a modular addition, where p t (i) is a permutation, which is different for each step.
